

Patterns of Emergence and Participation in Brazil

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1. General purpose

The aim of this prospectus is to present the theoretical framework for the study of the characteristics, determinants and consequences of the relative opening or closure of the political system in Brazil, in terms of what I call "emergence" and "participation." I shall deal with the general framework in a rather abstract way, and some indications about the research alternatives I am considering for the use of this framework will be given at the end of the paper.

A dramatization of the problem that concerns me is given by the Decree of the Argentine military government, which, after its take-over in 1966, declared a "political pause", and "outlawed" all forms of political activity. This restriction of the political activities is common to practically all military or quasi-military governments in Latin America, with different degrees of intensity. They serve an explicit purpose, namely, of clearing the way for an unimpaired administrative action by the government, and receive a more or less strong opposition from those whose political activities are curtailed. Below these manifest reasons

and oppositions are a series of consequences that I intend to deal with. Ultimately, I hope to be able to say something about the balance of costs and benefits that derive from a given level of political opening or closure in a given situation.

2. Two Concepts of Politics

Does the purpose of "abolishing" or "prohibiting" politics have any meaning in terms of political science? Would not this purpose be the equivalent, for Economics, of trying to "abolish" the economy through a govern- mental fiat? The analogy is not totally adequate. There are two concepts of politics that usually appear in the literature, which I believe are not exclusive, even if the emphasis very often does lean too much to a given side. Both meanings are conveyed by the definition of politics as the process (and, the political system, the structure) of authoritative allocation of scarce resources in a given society:


a. The emphasis on allocation of scarce resources includes implicitly the notion of power, and leads to an analysis of the political system in terms of the asymmetries of value allocations, and the structure that exists for the maintenance of a given pattern of allocation. The emphasis is, in other words, in answers to the question "who has the power?" or "who benefits" from a specific political arrangement? This emphasis is appropriate, I believe) for the analysis of long- term processes of political change, but can be inadequate for the study of the workings of a political system at the short run.

b. The emphasis on authoritative implies the idea that this allocation of resources is never performed through the exercise of sheer naked force, but is rather based on a certain level and type of legitimacy. This legitimacy implies at least two distinctive analytical elements. The first is the acceptance of this legitimacy and the Weberian typology of forms of authority is the classic approach to this aspect of politics. The second analytical element is the determination of the political arena, in terms of the actors that come to play the political game as well as of the issues that are brought into dispute. This second element is, I believe, a most useful approach to the study of the workings of a given political system in the short run.

The last emphasis points to the aspect of politics which is subject of variations in size and scope, either by changes in the basis of its legitimacy and/or by changes in the participants and games played within the political community. The relations between the two aspects, power and political community, long-range structures and short-range participation, are the central concern of the project) as they happen to apply to the Brazilian case.

3. The General Framework

The graph in the next page gives the general picture of the analytical framework I intend to use. The arrows indicate causal effects, and the whole picture is one of two sets of circular relationships, one of short term and another of long-term effects, which are related to each other. I will give in the following a brief summary of the general idea behind the graph, and the next several paragraphs of the prospectus will be dedicated to the conceptual elaboration of the boxes in the graph as well as of some of their relationships.



The long-term cycle indicates the broad relationships that exist between the changes of the country in terms of levels of modernization and development, or industrialization¹; its repercussions at the political level, in terms of demands of participation; the costs and benefits that derive from the specific filter that a given political structure is for these demands, in terms of how they feed back in the process of modernization and development. The assumption is that, at any given point in time, there is a demand of political participation that is determined, broadly speaking, by the existing levels of modernization and industrialization. These demands are at least partially channeled into the political system, in a way that is not fully dependent upon the same background variables of social and economic development, since it encounters a given political structure that has its own determinants². The combination of this political structure and the types and levels of participation have some specific consequences for the process of social change, which in turn leads to demands of participation, and so on.

The short-term cycle is limited to the political sphere. The independent variable here is the power system, a general term to characterize the arrangements of a given political establishment. This system entails, at any given point in time, a given structure of legitimate political participation, through which decisions are taken about the maintenance of the political establishment and the implementation of a given set of policy-orientations. These decisions feed back upon the political establishment, but not before passing through the filter that the levels and types of demands of participation are for the full autonomy of the cycle.

The interdependence between the two cycles is given, thus, by the contact between the levels of emergence,

¹ Industrialization is the main dimension of "development," a term used here to refer to the growth of those institutions and infrastructure necessary to the attainment of a given level of consumption. I have worked this distinction between modernization (referring to the level of consumption) and development in a previous unpublished paper, "On the Politics of Modernization," 1967.

² It is this same rationale, I believe, that leads Prof. David E. Apter to build his typology of "political systems from two independent sets of variables, one related to the political structure (degree of hierarchization) and the other to the prevalent value orientations of society (consummatory vs. instrumental). It will become clear further on that what I call "emergence" is a concept aimed to tap these alternatives of value orientations, among other things.

or demands of participation, and the structure of participation that is allowed by a given political establishment. It is obvious, thus, that the paths of causality do not have to follow only the sequences I-II-V-I and VI-III-V-IV. Since the two cycles are connected, the paths I-II-V-IV and IV-III-V-I are also possible, and it will be interesting to consider in which circumstances a given path is dominant upon the others.

4. Modernization and Development

A substantial amount of theoretical and empirical work has been done in this area, and I do not intend to develop any specially new approach here³. The basic distinction between modernization and development is that the first term refers to the growth of those patterns of consumption and expectations that are typical of the "developed" models, while the second refers to those social and mainly economic structures that are supposed to be necessary for the full achievement of those patterns of consumption and expectation. The study of lags and leads between these two sets of variables has proved to be very useful and amenable to empirical treatment, and leading to specific predictions of different forms of social and political instability, among other things.⁴

5. The Demands for Participation

The next sets of variables are those related to the different types and levels of modernization and development. There are different ways of conceptualizing these demands, and the following seems to be adequate to the purposes here.

Alessandro Pizzorno⁵ has suggested a typology of political participation that distinguishes between the professional and nonprofessional, and the types integrated or not with the prevalent rules of the political game (leading, among other things, to the question of the emergence of political cleavages and political "subcultures"). I would like to keep the first distinction, which leads to a differentiation between the analysis at the level of the elite and the analysis at the level of the general population. The second distinction, however, I would take rather as a dependent variable at the level of box V.

A further elaboration refers to the basis of agglutination of the different forms of collective political participation. The traditional liberal state supposes that the basis of agglutination and representation is

³ The bibliography here is obviously very extensive. It includes the pioneer works of Gino Germani (*Politica y Sociedad en una Época de Transición* 1962) and Daniel Lerner (*The Passing of Traditional Society*, 1953), and, among the more contemporary references, the attempts to use aggregate data analysis for the study of "political studies and political change (cf. the series of papers and publications of the Yale Political Data Program, the Dimensionality of Nations Project, the issues of the Bulletin of the Institute of Sociology of the University of Zurich/Fundación Bariloche, etc.).

⁴ Cf. the section on "Stages' of Economic and Political Development," part B of Russett, Alker, Deutsch and others, *World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators*, Yale, 1964. See also my article "International Systems and Intra-National Tensions - A Research Report" (*Bulletin*, Soziologisches Institut, Universitaat Zurich/Fundación Bariloche, 9, 1963) and Manuel Mora y Araujo's "Tensión estructural, Conflicto sociopolítico y desarrollo económico - un estudio comparativo," Dept. of Sociology, Fundación Bariloche, 1967.

⁵ "Introduzione allo studio della partecipazione politica," *Quaterni di Sociologia* 15, 3-4, 1966.

geographical, while the corporatist doctrine, which had its presence in Brazilian history, defines it mainly in terms of institutional, or sectorial cleavages. There is a third possible alternative, in terms of class identification, and I will keep these alternatives as empirical possibilities for research.

There is, finally, a set of categories that apply at a more general level, cutting across the distinctions above. It refers to the basic concerns and identification, at the psycho-sociological level, that are bound to appear in situations of political participation. I take this typology from the one suggested by Almond and Verba in their *Civic Culture*⁶, which I develop and adapt here. I shall use three alternatives of political orientation, which gives us three types. The first alternative, or variable, refers to whether there is a cathexis of the subjects. The benefits that the type 5 gets from the State are of a paternalistic kind, and one can imagine that the typical populist state in Latin America would be a combination of type 4 participation for urban middle sectors and of type 5 for lower groups. The type 6, finally, corresponds to the mobilization of populations for input activities through ideological motivations, and is typical of revolutionary regimes.

6. The Structure of Participation

The expression "political "participation" will characterize, in this context, the areas and other aspects of political participation that are open to a given person or group in a given society. I shall refer not only to legal participation, in terms of enfranchisement, for instance⁷, but also to the amount of participation which is actually allowed in a given situation. I am not sure, and actually doubt, that it is possible to come up with a general measure of the overall level of opening of a given system at a given point in time. But it is possible to obtain evaluations, I submit, of different dimensions of participation for a given individual, or group, as well as for a specific dimension of political participation for the society as a whole. The following table gives some of the main dimensions for this analysis, and corresponds to the dimensions of political participation in terms of permissiveness:

How much participation is actually allowed?		
	For individuals and subgroups:	For society as a whole
Which issues are open for political bargaining?	Who can bargain?	Which issues are open, and which are defined as "nonpolitical"?
How wide is the scope of decisions?	Which aspects, and which range of alternatives are open?	Which groups and sectors are in a condition to decide which section of the total range of alternatives on an issue?

⁶ Page 16, first chapter of the Little, Brown & Co. edition, 1965. The distinction between "self" and "system" as objects of affection does not seem very fruitful. There was no place, in the typology suggested by Almond and Verba, for the Germans and Mexicans of their own study. But they could be easily fitted, as I have done here.

⁷ Lipset and Rokkan suggest a list of four thresholds (legitimation, incorporation, representation and majority power) that are to be conquered in the path of full political participation. Cf. their introduction to *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 1967.

Control	What is the probability of control of deviant behavior for a given group or individual?	How extensive is the coercive apparatus?
Severity of control	Who is more susceptible to forceful repression?	What is the overall level of violence of the system?
Relevance	How relevant are the issues and scope open for a given group or sector?	How wide is participation felt as relevant?

The above can lead to a fairly detailed characterization of the permissiveness of a political system from a given standpoint; it allows an analysis of how a given group, sector or individual inserts himself into the political community, and points also to the way leading to a more general characterization of the overall level of opening of the political system as a whole, even if it falls somehow short of it. The combination of this structure of participation with the demands of participation, in terms of the previous paragraph, generates a set of consequences that are to be discussed under the number 8 below. Before it, however, a reference is necessary to Box IV, the characteristics of the political establishment.

7. The Political Establishment

Which kinds of political establishments lead to a more or less restricted area of political participation? It is fairly clear that the "proposition that a closed political community is a consequence of governmental instability is not enough as an answer. There is always a wide margin of option in any given situation, and a good case can be made for the thesis that the military governments in Latin America usually overreact to what is often very little but imaginary threats. The analysis of this question has to be done at two levels. One, in terms of our long-term cycle, must establish the relations between the basis of support of a given political establishment and the demands of participation generated by the process of modernization and development; the obvious proposition is that, the more the demands outgrow this basis, the more the political establishment will tend to close the areas of participation. The other, more detailed approach, can perhaps show how this closure derives from some internal characteristics of the groups that hold the center of political power - how the hierarchical structure of the military establishment, for instance, tends to impose a hierarchical structure of policy-making which is incompatible with higher levels of participation and depends only partially on the needs of self-defense in terms of the more general level of analysis.

8. Costs and Benefits

The balance of consequences of the confluence of boxes II and III in the graph can be thought of in terms of Apter's proposed inverse susceptible the political establishment is to the influence of the demands of participation are open empirical questions. Regarding the long-term cycle, there is the basic alternative between a process of change which is absolutely a function of political events (let us say, the existence of a plan of economic growth) and a process that is essentially independent of what is done at the governmental

level (when the relative weight of the government in the country is small, or when the external influences are too strong). The same alternatives exist for the short-term cycle: a political establishment can have a basis that does not depend on the demands of participation, and its consequences, or it can depend upon a continuous coping with these demands. In any situation it is relevant to know which is the independent and the dependent variable, government or the process of change--and the answer might well be that they have independent and unrelated causes and consequences.

9. Research Alternatives

I am presently considering different research alternatives that could apply this general framework for the understanding of the Brazilian political process. The final decisions will depend on many circumstantial elements, among which are the facilities I will have at my disposal and the need to coordinate my research project with those of my colleagues in Brazil. There are two things, however, that I intend to do. The first is a historical analysis, in which four or five political regimes in Brazil are analyzed in terms of this framework. The second is an extensive field research on a more contemporary aspect of the general scheme.

a. Historical Analysis

It is possible to distinguish four or five clearly different periods in Brazilian history, in terms of levels of emergence and structures of participation. The first, the XIX Century Empire, was characterized by a very narrow spectrum of participation and very limited emergence. The process of social change and the basis of support of the political establishment were quite independent from each other, and the main political issues, in terms of scope, referred to the alternatives between a more or a less centralized political regime - a conflict largely solved in favor of centralization. The second period is the so-called "Old Republic," from 1889 (or 1891) to 1930. It corresponded to a breakdown in the centralized Empire, to the benefit of the few powerful states of the Federation. The decentralized regime brought a very ample juridical structure of participation, establishing a formal democracy that had no actual correspondence in terms of actual demands of participation. The democratic regime meant a debilitation of the central government and of those groups that did not have a strong regional, rural basis for themselves - notably the military. Both the military and some other more active urban groups became the main source of political emergence that challenged the Old Republic in terms of what it actually was, an oligarchic regime, as well as of its decentralization, a liberalism that covered governmental inaction and lack of policy-making. The juridical formalism was the approved style of political participation in the period, while the intellectuality in the opposition looked for the sociological foundations for a more technical, more modern, more efficient and also less democratic political regime.

The third period is, in a way, a materialization of the objectives of these emerging groups. The Vargas period (1930-1945), following a successful revolution that brought the emerging groups of the previous

period into the political community through a split in the previous oligarchical entente, lasted from 1930 to 1945. The levels of political emergence increased during this period in the urban areas, and it is also possible to consider that the spectrum of political participation was enlarged, even if at expenses of the functioning of the democratic regime in its formalities. The fourth period corresponds to the reopening of the political democracy in 1945, and goes until the 1964 military take-over. It corresponds, in a way, to a return to the pre-Vargas period, but the main difference is that now the demands of participation are high. The last period, finally, starting in 1964, implies a closure of the structure of participation, in a situation of high demands.

A schematic description of the five periods can be given as follows:

	Structure of participation	Emergence
Empire (1822-1889)	Close	Limited
Old Republic (1891-1930)	Open	Limited
Vargas period (1930-1945)	Close	Moderate
Second Republic (1945-1964)	Open	Moderate - high
1964 Regime	Close	High

In terms of our graph, the second column corresponds to the secular process of growing political mobilization, while the first indicates a pendular variation in the relative size of the political community of participation. A substantial part of the dissertation will probably be dedicated to the discussion of how these periods can be understood in terms of the general framework, and how the framework helps us to understand the transitions from one to another.

b. Field Analysis

The fieldwork will consist in a more detailed and empirically induced examination of some aspects of the general framework, in the "period of the Second Republic or of today. Depending upon the availability of time and resources, and on the coordination with other research projects also in progress, I would like to cover the following:

1. An analysis of the determinants and characteristics of "political emergence. This analysis should be based in an extensive use of aggregate data at the lowest possible level, combining socioeconomic characteristics with elections data. The presumption is that this can determine, first, the structure of box I, and second its relations with box II.
2. An analysis of box II would hopefully be based in an attitudinal study of the population of the classic type, for the nonprofessional politician. For the professional, however, an elite study is necessary. There are

two possibilities for a study of political and other emerging elites. One is a longitudinal analysis of the circulation of the top "n" members of the political elite in the "n" top political roles - to see where the role players in a moment t_1 are in the moment t_2 , and, conversely, who was recruited to fulfill the place of those from t_1 that dropped out in t_2 . This study can be done with biographic data, and can be combined with a standard survey of the present social, economic and political elites in the area. They can lead not only to an understanding of box II, but also of the relations between boxes II and III.

3. An analysis of the process of decision-making in selected issues, at different points in time--regarding education, the creation and maintenance of the State Monopoly of Petrol, policies of development, problems of urban administration, and so on. This analysis, if made in terms of the general scheme, could lead to a clear view of the effects of the relations between boxes II and III (that is, box V) and the process of change, in one hand, and the political structure in the other.

Decisions on priority have to be made, and I believe that much of the general view can be seen from almost any of those different perspectives. I will not attempt, however, to go too far in the analysis of box V, and even box III will be taken mainly in terms of how it is perceived by the emerging groups, rather than from the standpoint of the political establishment. The general historical analysis, as well as other studies in progress, will surely help to fill in the picture that will have to remain necessarily incomplete.

Berkeley, December 1968
